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PREINVENTION ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENT
BREACH: A PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVE TO
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OR UNQUALIFIED
INJUNCTION
I. INTRODUCTION
A layperson regards his or her thoughts as an absolutely private
sanctuary where no other person can intrude. That could be why
DSC Communications, Inc. v. Brown' strikes such a chord with the
public.
DSC has sued Brown, a former employee, under a preinvention
assignment agreement 2 in an attempt to force Brown to disclose an
idea that he conceived during his tenure with the company. The
unique feature of the case is that the idea at issue exists only in
Brown's head-and DSC wants it.
The case raises several issues. First, at what point in its
development from an intangible concept to a tangible embodiment
reduced to practice does an idea become ownable?3 Second, to
what extent should an employer be entitled to capitalize on an
employee's inventions and innovations developed outside the scope
of the employment? Third, assuming the employer does own and
is entitled to an idea, what remedies are available to make the
employer whole, and more specifically, can an employer force an
employee to disclose the contents of his or her mind? This last
issue is the focus of this Note.
At first, the notion of a court compelling Brown to share his
thoughts conjures Orwellian visions of dark rooms with bright
spotlights. As two scholars point out, however, society accepts
' DSC Communications Corp. v. Brown, No. 199-596-97 (D. Tex. filed September 29,
1997).
a A "preinvention assignment agreement" is an agreement where one party assigns
ownership of inventions before those inventions are conceived. Steven Cherensky, A Penny
for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements, and
Personhood, 81 CAL. L. REV. 597, 599 (1993).
a One scholar suggests that a concept becomes ownable only when reduced to practice.
Ronald B. Cooley, Definitions, Duties, Covenants Not to Compete, Assignment After
Termination and Severability, 14 AIPLA Q.J. 20, 22 (1986), available in Westlaw, AIPLAQJ
database. Controversy surrounds the issue.
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compelled disclosure in various situations.4 They note that
business people have fiduciary duties to disclose information, that
courts may sometimes order reporters to disclose sources, and that
some laws require citizens to come forth with details of crimes
committed by other people.
5
Still, compelled performance under a contract is not the norm.
When one realizes that this contract involves an employer trying to
convince a court to invade the inner recesses of an inventor's
cranium, more than a little skepticism at the practicality and
likelihood of success is warranted. The appropriateness of forced
disclosure poses policy as well as practical problems, and the issue
makes for an interesting inquiry.
This Note presumes the existence of an enforceable contract with
reasonably certain terms, the absence of formational defects, and
a breach by defendant Brown. The remainder of Part I presents
the factual background of the dispute, identifies numerous policy
concerns, and sketches the framework of the applicable law. Part
II examines the adequacy of damages at law and concludes that a
monetary remedy is inadequate because Brown's performance is
irreplaceable and because of the speculative nature of any estimate.
Part III scrutinizes specific performance as a possible alternative
for the court and concludes that practical considerations and the
personal nature of Brown's services prohibit such an order. Part IV
addresses the viability of injunction 6 as relief for DSC and con-
cludes that although the remedy would not unreasonably interfere
with Brown's ability to work, the contract's indefinite duration
militates against this solution. Part V acknowledges the inherent
imperfection of all available remedies and suggests a practical
solution.
4 John S. Pratt & Peter Dosik, Whose Idea is It? Company Sues Ex-Employee, NATL L.J.,
Oct. 20, 1997, at c.17.
8 Id.
'Hereinafter, "injunction" describes a court order forbidding a breaching party from
rendering the contracted-for performance to anyone besides the other party to the contract.
A court could consider this form of relief as one alternative based on the notion that Brown
has an implied duty to refrain from performing his obligations to DSC for a third party.
632 [Vol. 5:631
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CONTRACT REMEDIES
A. FACTUAL FRAMEWORK
One evening in 1975, defendant Brown and several friends sat
around his kitchen table discussing a lingering technological
problem involving translating antiquated binary code computer
programs into newer, more usable languages.7 Then, as now,
program modifications could be made only after an individual
worker translated the antiquated codes line by line into more
modem languages.' The labor and time-intensive translation
process presented an incredible obstacle for businesses because of
the expense involved.
Brown ruminated over the problem for the next .twelve years. He
worked toward developing an algorithm to operate within a
computer program that would "reverse engineer" the program from
the older relic language into a more modem language.' During the
twelve year period preceding his relationship with DSC, Brown
maintains that he engineered 80% of the solution entirely in his
head without making any notes or models. 0
On April 21, 1987, DSC Communications, a telephone switching
developer and marketer located in Plano, Texas, hired Brown to
provide technical support to its engineers.' Six days following
Brown's employment, DSC presented him with an "Employee
Patent, Copyright and Proprietary Information Agreement"
containing the following provisions:
In consideration of my employment (or continued
employment in the event I am already in the employ
of the Company at the time of execution hereof) with
DSC Communications Corporation or any subsidiary
or affiliate thereof (the "Company") and of the salary
or wages paid for my services in such employment,
the Company and I agree as follows:
Defendant Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support at 2, DSC
Communications Corp. v. Brown (No. 199-596-97).
s DSC Sues Ex-Worker over Software Idea He Has in His Head, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1997,
at B12.
'Defendant's Brief at 2, DSC Communications Corp., (No. 199-596-97).
10 Id.
11 Id.
19981 633
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(A) I will communicate to an officer of the Company
promptly and fully all inventions (including but not
limited to all matters subject to patent, i.e., process-
es, machines, computer programs, etc.) made or
conceived by me (whether made solely by me or
jointly with others) from the time of entering the
Company's employ until I leave (1) which are along
the lines of the business, work or investigations of
the Company or of companies which it owns or
controls at the time of such inventions, or (2) which
result from or are suggested by any work which I
may do for or on behalf of the Company.
(B) I will assist the Company and its nominees
during an [sic] subsequent to such employment in
every proper way (entirely at its or their expense) to
obtain for its or their own benefit patents for such
inventions in any and all countries (including the
assignment of any inventions to the Company), said
inventions to be and remain the sole and exclusive
property of the Company or its nominees whether
patented or not ....
(E) I will notify the Company in writing before I
make any disclosure or perform or cause to be
performed any work for or on behalf of the Company,
which might conflict with (1) the rights I claim in
any invention or idea (a) conceived by me or others
prior to my employment or (b) otherwise outside the
scope of this Agreement .... In the event of my
failure to give notice under the circumstances speci-
fied in (1) of the foregoing, the Company may assume
that no such conflicting invention or idea exists, and
I agree that I will make no claim against the Compa-
ny with respect to the use of any such invention or
idea in any work or the product of any work which I
perform or cause to be performed for or on behalf of
the Company ......
12 Id. at Exhibit 1.
634 [Vol. 5:631
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CONTRACT REMEDIES
The agreement also contained a section allowing Brown an
opportunity to exempt preexisting inventions that he "owned or
controlled" from the provisions of the agreement. 13 Not thinking
of the 80% complete innovation he developed over the past twelve
years, Brown signed the agreement and indicated that he did not
wish to exclude any discoveries or innovations."
While driving home after a long weekend in March of 1996,
Brown conceptualized the missing pieces of the solution. 5 He
took his untested, undocumented concept to DSC officials seeking
their acknowledgment that the idea was his personal property so
that he could begin refining and developing the idea. 6 Ultimate-
ly, DSC refused to concede that the idea fell outside of the scope of
the agreement and fired Brown for refusing to disclose the concept
to the company.1
7
DSC then filed suit against Brown for breaching the preinvention
assignment agreement. The company sought a declaratory
judgement recognizing that DSC owned the idea. The company
also requested the following relief: First, DSC asked the court to
forbid Brown from disclosing the solution to anyone other than the
company.1 8 Second, DSC asked the court to enjoin Brown from
further developing his process. 9 Third, the company demanded
that the court deny Brown the ability to negotiate with third
parties about any subject relating to the idea.2° Fourth, DSC
asked the court to restrain Brown from selling or transferring the
solution.2 Finally, the company requested that the court require
Brown to disclose his idea.22
The Texas District Court granted DSC's requests to restrain
Brown on a temporary basis.' The court further ordered Brown
'3 Id. at 2.
14Id.
' Id. at 3.
18Id.
17 Id.
'a Plaintiffs First Amended Original Petition and Application for Injunctive Relief at 7,
DSC Communications Corp. v. Brown (No. 199-596-97).
1"Id.
2D Id. at 8.
21 Id.
2id.
' DSC Sues Ex-Worker Over Software Idea He Has in His Head, WALL ST. J., May 5,
1997, at B12.
1998] 635
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to disclose the idea to the company.24 Brown, however, refuses to
discuss his innovation.'
Brown maintains that his idea falls outside of the scope of the
agreement. He draws a distinction between inventions and ideas
and maintains that he is only required to assign inventions under
the agreement.2" He asserts that at present his idea is merely an
abstract conception and will require significant research, testing,
and development before it can be reduced to functional form."
Brown speculates that writing the idea down would require a
month of labor.2" Because of these factors, Brown argues that the
idea is presently not concrete enough to be termed an invention.
B. THRESHOLD CONSIDERATIONS
Given the pervasiveness of preinvention assignment agreements
used to circumvent common law rules governing ownership of
inventions, disputes like the one between DSC and Brown are
likely to recur. The present controversy provides an opportunity to
examine the practical, equitable, and policy-related problems that
arise in a typical conflict of this type.
1. What is Wrong with this Picture? DSC seeks equitable relief,
and Brown wants the agreement nullified. Essentially, both parties
seek the court's equitable intervention. Critical reflection on the
facts surrounding the conflict, however, leaves an observer troubled
by the parties' requests. Comparing DSC v. Brown with Weeks v.
Pratt,29 a 1930 case from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
clarifies the reasons for this discomfort.
In Weeks the plaintiff businessmen filed suit against an inventor.
Plaintiffs sought specific performance of a contract to form a
2 4 Id.
*. NBC Nightly News: Profile: Former Employee Keeps His New Idea in His Head,
Company Sues, Saying the Idea Is Company Property (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 14,
1997).
" Defendant Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support at 2, DSC
Communications Corp. v. Brown (No. 199-596-97).
2 Id. at 3.
=Id.
2 43 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1930).
[Vol. 5:631636
6
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol5/iss2/10
CONTRACT REMEDIES
corporation for developing, patenting, and exploiting two of the
defendant's inventions.30 The inventor, a sixty-five year old
retired train engineer, designed a device that increased gas mileage
of internal combustion gasoline engines to approximately 400 miles
per gallon."' The inventor also created a gasoline substitute
costing approximately a penny per gallon to manufacture, much
less than the costs associated with producing gasoline at the
time.
Prior to entering the contract with the plaintiffs, the inventor
received offers from two automobile manufacturers for $1 million
and $1.35 million in exchange for the rights to his creations.3
Fearing that the manufacturers planned to suppress or block
development of his innovations to the detriment of the public, the
inventor refused these offers. 4
Instead he entered negotiations with the plaintiffs, asserting that
he would not disclose any information until the parties reached a
written agreement. 3' The inventor strenuously emphasized in his
negotiations that because he wanted the public to reap the benefits
of his discoveries, he would not do business with any party who
intended to suppress his inventions.36 Ultimately, the parties
entered into an agreement that required the inventor's personal
services in developing the invention, granted the inventor power to
name a majority of the board of directors, and compensated both
the plaintiffs and the inventor for their personal services.37
Despite the plaintiffs' assurances to the inventor that he would
retain control of the corporation, the contract that the parties
signed proved misleading. Although the inventor retained the
power to appoint a majority of the members of the board of
directors, the agreement contained a clause requiring a two-thirds
majority vote to pass major corporate decisions.38 This provision
30 Id. at 54.
! Id.
32 Id.
Id.34 id.
35Id.
HId. at 56.
37 Id. at 56-57.
' Id.
1998] 637
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nullified the inventor's ability to manage the business or command
decision-making processes.3 9
In denying the plaintiffs' request for specific performance, the
court relied heavily on their awareness of the inventor's intent to
ensure that the public benefitted from his discoveries.40 Noting
testimony indicating that the inventions were worth between $40
million and $1 billion, the court deemed the $10,000 one-time
payment and $1000 monthly salary given to the inventor grossly
inadequate. 41  Relying on the personal nature of the services
called for by the agreement, the inadequacy of consideration, the
plaintiffs' failure to deliver promised control of the corporation, and
implicitly on the air of less than honest dealing by the plaintiffs the
court refused to order specific performance of the agreement.42
Although the factual similarities between Weeks and the
DSC/Brown controversy are striking, Weeks has a feature that
separates it from the present conflict. The Weeks court viewed the
inventor as an altruistic actor with humanitarian motives and
noted a stark contrast between his behavior and that of the
predatory businessmen. Contrastingly, the present dispute is
purely a commercial dispute between two parties motivated by
money.
2. What Makes DSC Unsympathetic? DSC officials want to reap
the windfall benefits of Brown's labors despite the company's
complete lack of contribution to the idea's development. Even
though the company concedes that the discovery falls outside of the
scope of its normal business activities, it claims to own the idea and
justifies the vigor of its attack under the guise of fiduciary obliga-
tions to stockholders.43 Incredibly, DSC insists on entitlement to
an idea that Brown developed completely independently of his
professional role at DSC using no company time or resources. The
company offers a labored, manipulated reading of the agreement to
justify actions that smell suspiciously like misappropriation of
Brown's idea.
9Id. 56.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 56-57.
42 Id. at 57.
"Roger Witherspoon, The Thought that Counts: Former Employer Claims Ownership of
Piano Man's Idea (visited Aug. 16, 1997) <http/www.startext.net/new/doec1047/
1:B1Z33/1:B1Z33071597.htm1>.
638 [Vol. 5:631
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In all likelihood part of DSC's motivation relates to its desire to
make an example out of Brown. No doubt, the company employs
other technologically skilled people besides Brown, and this action
certainly is not the company's first experience as a trade secrets
plaintiff." As a corporate entity, DSC knows that making an
example of Brown decreases the likelihood of similar challenges
from other employees. This dispute is important to DSC because
a win will result in judicial sanctioning of the company's hiring
tactics.
To understand the significance of such an endorsement, imagine
the circumstances leading to the present controversy. Brown
negotiated with DSC to come to work as a technical support
engineer. Before coming to work, he negotiated his salary and the
terms of his employment. Once secure in his understanding of the
terms of DSC's offer, he gave notice to his previous employer and
waited to start his new job. Brown reasonably believed that the
negotiation process was finished.
Six days after Brown arrived at DSC, the company decided to
renegotiate its agreement with him. DSC made him an offer that,
unless unemployment was not a problem, Brown could not refuse.
In exchange for DSC's commitment to let him keep his job, the
company required Brown to sign an agreement granting rights to
his creative processes.
Certainly, Brown could have declined to sign. Bear in mind,
however, that Brown may have given up a job in reliance on his
earlier deal with DSC. He was likely aware that he needed DSC
much more than DSC needed him. With no opportunity to bargain
about the terms of the agreement, Brown's inferior bargaining
power is clear.
The timing of DSC's presentation of the agreement to Brown
operates to the company's disadvantage. If the preinvention
assignment agreement was important to company interests, why
did DSC fail to address the issue during the parties' initial
negotiations? DSC's misuse of its superior bargaining position
makes the company an unsympathetic plaintiff.
Evan Ramstad, DSC Won't Pay a Penny for His Thoughts, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1997,
at B4C.
1998] 639
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3. Why is Brown Unsympathetic? Brown looks no more sympa-
thetic than DSC. Clearly, in securing Brown's signature on the
agreement, DSC officials did not lie to Brown, misrepresent the
terms or the scope of the agreement, or offer any explicit threats.
Furthermore, Brown is a sophisticated computer engineer. He is
a poor candidate for an unconscionability claim.
Moreover, Brown's failure to exempt his binary translation
mechanism amplifies an observer's lack of sympathy. He abdicated
responsibility for his own interests but now expects the court to
rescue him from the consequences. In light of his freely given
consent, his only complaint lies in his displeasure with the bargain
he made.
If Brown's lack of attention to his rights poses a problem,
questions about his credibility further complicate matters. Brown
worked on the problem for about twenty years, but, incredibly, he
maintains that he never made the first note. Now, in deliberate
defiance to the lawful orders of a court, he willfully refuses to
relinquish information that by his own consent belongs to the
company.
Finally, unlike the Weeks inventor, Brown has no altruistic
"benefit-of-the-public" justification for his breach. He has breached
his agreement in bad faith with no unforeseen circumstances
making performance practically or economically infeasible. In fact,
he offers no justification at all for his breach. Financial motives
provide the only plausible explanation for his actions.
4. Independent Considerations. Accounting for the parties'
respective interests produces a controversy of sufficient complexity.
Finding a solution becomes more difficult, however, when one
considers the numerous external considerations that warrant a role
in the balance.
First, the court must resolve this dispute in a way that preserves
judicial credibility and integrity. Fashioning a remedy that the
court cannot enforce ultimately undermines the public's faith in the
judicial system. Furthermore, remedies that call on a court to
evaluate performances that are not objectively quantifiable arouse
public suspicions that a court's decision-making processes are
grounded in sympathy rather than rational examination according
to legal principles.
640 [Vol. 5:631
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Second, the court must consider the potential effects of its
solution on judicial economy. Whatever solutions the court fashions
must terminate the dispute without the need for constant judicial
intervention to resolve ongoing conflicts. The court must find a
way to grant Brown and DSC a divorce to prevent the necessity of
judicial intervention in perpetuity.
Third, the court must fashion an economically efficient remedy
that maximizes value, minimizes transaction costs, and fairly
allocates the risk of the idea's failure. The uncertainty surrounding
the invention's ultimate success increases the risks of either over
or under compensating DSC; likewise, a bad remedy might punish
or reward Brown for his breach. Bearing in mind that contract
remedies find their basis in economic efficiency and not as punitive
measures, the court must strive to reach a fair result that allocates
risks appropriately.
Fourth, the court must address the tension between protecting an
inventor's incentive to create and honoring private agreements.
Enforcing broad agreements like this one may dilute incentive to
create by excluding the conceivers from the ranks of benefit
receivers. Courts, however, must also balance society's interests in
fostering creative endeavors with the reasonable expectations that
contracting parties have of receiving the benefits of bargains made.
The courts must also account for policies favoring honoring
individual autonomy by allowing freedom to contract. Furthermore,
judicial disfavor of overly broad agreements between employers and
employees because of inequities of bargaining power also come into
play.
Finally, .this idea has a shelf life. Every day that the parties
delay, a third party could be edging closer to a comparable solution.
Furthermore, every hour of delay results in another hour that a
business pays someone to translate the old programs. Once
companies expend and pay for those personnel hours, both money
and time are lost forever. The process loses value over time
because the volume of work left to be done decreases. Further,
market efficiencies favor getting new, useful, innovative products
to the marketplace. For all of these reasons, fashioning a remedy
for DSC in the face of Brown's breach presents unique problems.
1998]
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C. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
1. Governing Law. State law governs the controversy at hand
because a patent is not yet at issue. Although the Patent Act of
1988 governs patent ownership and assignability of patent
rights,46 the Act has no provision addressing assignment of the
rights to an idea or invention before the invention is made.46
Consequently, in a controversy concerning ownership rights to
inventions and ideas, state law supplies the rules of decision.47
Because Brown's idea is not yet reduced to practice and hence
unpatentable, the outcome of the dispute will be controlled by the
common law.
2. Traditional Remedies and Preferences. Traditionally, Anglo-
American courts prefer substitutes for performance to specific
performance upon contractual breach.4" Specific performance is
an extraordinary remedy that is available only in limited situa-
tions. This preference for money damages has been explained in
various ways, including the view of contract formation as a means
of risk allocation49 and the notion of efficient breach.5" Very
specialized rules have developed for evaluating the appropriateness
of specific performance as a remedy. Courts have ordered specific
4See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994).
" Evelyn D. Pisegna-Cook, Ownership Rights of Employee Inventions: The Role of
Preinvention Assignment Agreements and State Statutes, 2 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 163,
173 (1994).
" See University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 762 F. Supp. 1212, 1219 n.8, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1401 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (asserting that "[s]tate law, rather than federal patent law,
generally governs ownership rights in patentable inventions .... ."); Aronson v. Quick Point
Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1979) (concluding that because
commercial agreements traditionally fall within the control of state law, "[sitate law is not
displaced merely because the contract relates to intellectual property which may or may not
be patentable; the states are free to regulate the use of such intellectual property in any
manner not inconsistent with federal law.").
"JOHN D. CALAMARU & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF-CONTRACTS § 16-1, at 660 (3d
ed. 1987).
49 See EDWARD YORIO, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNC-
TIONS § 1.4.2, at 18 (1989) (explaining the theory that contract law finds its. basis in
allocation of risks of nonperformance rather enforcement of moral obligations).
"See E. Allen Farnsworth, A Common Lawyer's View of His Civilian Colleagues, 57 LA.
L. REV. 227, 235 (1996).
642 [Vol. 5:631
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performance under a variety of fact-specific conditions.5'
In deciding whether to order specific performance or enjoin a
breach of contract, courts examine a range of issues. The threshold
inquiry involves deciding whether or not the remedy at law
adequately protects the damaged party's interests.52 If a party
requests specific performance, courts frequently require more
definite terms than required at law. 3 Courts rarely specifically
enforce contracts requiring personal services; 4 however, they
sometimes issue injunctions against breach of expressed or implied
negative covenants found in agreements to render personal
services.55 Additionally, courts are reluctant to order specific
performance of contracts that might require extensive supervision
by the court. 6 When no means of ensuring compliance exists,
courts are loathe to use the remedy. 7 Finally, courts account for
the public effects of enforcement" and sometimes express a
willingness to inquire into the adequacy of exchange. 9
D. THE PLAN
The remainder of this Note evaluates the factors that a court
considers in deciding what remedy suits the controversy between
DSC and Brown. An initial assessment of the adequacy of damages
at law reveals the company can probably meet the threshold
requirement for equitable relief. Next, a detailed survey of the
rules governing the availability of specific performance demon-
strates that practical and policy-related problems prevent such a
remedy. Then, an appraisal of the availability of an injunction
" See Kingsley v. United States, 968 F.2d 109 (1st Cir. 1992) (ordering specific
performance of prosecutor's plea agreement promises to a criminal defendant); Vandeventer
v. Dale Constr. Co., 534 P.2d 183 (Or. 1975) (ordering specific performance of a contract to
extend financing).
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (1991).
' CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 48 § 16-8, at 671.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 (1991); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS, § 12.7 at 868 (2d ed. 1990).
5Id.
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 366 (1991).
'7 FARNSWORTH, supra note 54, § 12.4, at 853.
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 cmt. c (1991).
59 CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 48, § 16.14, at 678.
1998] 643
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reveals a viable option for the court, but other concerns result in
the conclusion that this avenue should not be pursued without
qualification. Finally, this Note proposes one practical solution.
II. CAN MONEY MAKE DSC WHOLE?
The threshold issue that the court must resolve involves asking
whether or not money can make DSC whole. As a general rule,
courts will not order specific performance if damages would
adequately compensate the injured plaintiff.60 Examination of two
factors reveals that a money damages award offers insufficient
protection for DSC's interests. First, DSC's inability to obtain a
substitute performance using a money award suggests that the
remedy offers the company insufficient protection. Second, the lack
of a reasonably certain basis upon which to calculate the damages
weighs in favor of concluding that the remedy at law is inadequate.
A. DSC CANNOT BUY WHAT BROWN HAS
DSC's inability to buy a comparable substitute performance offers
a partial justification for the conclusion that the company's remedy
at law is inadequate. Sedmak v. Charlie's Chevrolet, Inc.6" high-
lights the kinds of facts that a court examines in determining
whether the remedy at law fails for inadequacy. There, the
plaintiff buyers sued the defendant automobile dealer for specific
performance of a contract to sell a special limited production
Corvette pace car.62 Upon receiving a car with the options speci-
fied by the buyers, the dealer informed the plaintiffs that he would
not honor the agreement.' The dealer advised the plaintiffs that
if they still wished to make the purchase they would have to bid on
the car." Finding the buyers' remedy at law inadequate, the
court ordered the dealership to sell the car to the buyers for the
agreed amount.'
60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1)(1991).
1 622 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
2Id. at 695.
63 id.
" Id.
65Id. at 700.
644 [Vol. 5:631
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In reaching its decision, the appeals court noted that although
the car was not unique in the traditional sense, several facts made
specific performance appropriate. The court remarked that
obtaining a car with comparable mileage and options, in an
equivalent condition, and with a similar appearance would be an
expensive, long-term, and inconvenient process." The court
commented on the limited production run and the even smaller
number of cars made with the options that the plaintiffs request-
ed. 7 Finally, the court remarked that offers by other parties
ranging from nine to thirteen thousand dollars over the agreed
price and made by parties in Hawaii and Florida illustrated the
demand for the cars and the unlikelihood that a comparable
replacement existed."
Under even stronger facts than in Sedmak, DSC can show that
Brown's idea is a unique commodity not subject to substitution. In
Sedmak the court concluded that obtaining a comparable car on the
open market, while conceivable, would necessitate a great deal of
time and hassle for the plaintiffs. Here, because Brown's idea
solves a lingering technological problem for which the open market
has yet to devise a solution, the outcome becomes clearer. Any
substitute DSC obtained would necessarily be the product of a
research and development campaign, an effort far exceeding the
complexity that the Sedmak plaintiffs would have experienced in
obtaining a substitute. Consequently, the uniqueness of Brown's
idea and its unavailability on the open market weigh heavily in
favor of concluding that a legal remedy is inadequate.
B. ESTIMATES OF DSC'S DAMAGES ARE SPECULATIVE
The speculativeness of DSC's damages also weighs in favor of
rejecting money damages as adequate. Triple-A Baseball Club
Associates v. Northeastern Baseball, Inc.69 offers an illustration of
the facts necessary to demonstrate the inadequacy of a remedy at
law.
6 0 Id.6 7 Id.
" Id.
9832 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1987).
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In that case, the First Circuit Court of Appeals ordered specific
performance of a contract to convey a Triple-A minor league
baseball franchise because the buyer had no adequate remedy at
law.7" The buyer, on a quest to bring Triple-A baseball to a newly
constructed stadium in Scranton, Pennsylvania, contracted with the
seller, owner of a franchise based in Old Orchard Beach, Maine.7
The buyer also owned a Double-A franchise playing out of Water-
bury, Connecticut, and he planned to sell his Double-A team and
move his operation to Scranton in 1987.72 In 1987, however, the
seller refused to transfer the Triple-A team as promised.73
In concluding that damages at law offered inadequate compensa-
tion for the buyer's interests, the court criticized several of the
seller's arguments. Responding to the seller's suggestion that the
court should not require transfer of the Triple-A team because the
buyer already owned a baseball team, the court observed that
Triple-A teams played better quality baseball than Double-A
teams.74 The court deemed the buyer's ownership of a Double-A
team irrelevant in determining the adequacy of damages at law.75
The court greeted the seller's proposed computation of damages
with equal skepticism. By subtracting the profits made by the
Triple-A team in 1987 from the profits made by the buyer's Double-
A team during the same year, the seller argued that the court could
reach a reasonably certain measure of damages.76 The court
criticized the approach by pointing out that the computations
assumed comparability between profits of a Triple-A team playing
in an older stadium in Old Orchard Beach to profits that the same
team would generate in a new stadium in Scranton.77 The court
further disparaged the seller's omission of a formula to measure
future lost profits and additional expenses incurred in the buyer's
quest for another Triple-A team.78 Concluding that the Triple-A
70 Id. at 228.
71 Id. at 216.
72 Id.
7 Id. at 218.
74 Id. at 224.
75 Id. at 224-225.
76 Id. at 225.
" Id.
78 Id.
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franchise had no "readily ascertainable market value" the court
found specific performance the most appropriate remedy.79
Like the buyer in Triple-A, any attempts to estimate DSC's
damages fail as inherently speculative. Brown's idea is undevel-
oped and untested. Experts do not agree that a solution to the
technological problem Brown claims to have solved is possible. The
costs of further developing the idea are unknown and unknowable,
and whether or not development will be fruitful is wholly imponder-
able.
Similarly, in the event that the algorithm performs as claimed,
valuation problems still exist. The current costs of line-by-line
translations run into the millions of dollars.80 Without knowing
the costs of development, the time needed to develop the solution,
and correspondingly, the amount of translation work left to be done
after development, any estimate of future profits remains a mere
guess. The inherent speculativeness of any attempt to calculate
development, marketing, and other implementation costs coupled
with the difficulty of calculating future gross revenues renders
DSC's remedy at law inadequate.
C. MONEY CANNOT COMPENSATE DSC
Because Brown's idea is a unique commodity and DSC cannot
obtain a substitute without considerable inconvenience, uncertain-
ty, and delay, and because neither party can estimate DSC's
damages with reasonable certainty, the court must conclude that
damages at law are inadequate. Passing this threshold issue
enables the court to examine the possibilities of equitable remedies.
Examination of specific performance and injunction follows.
III. CAN A COURT FORCE BRowN's DISCLOSURE AND
PARTICIPATION IN THE PATENT PROCESS?
Once the court determines that money damages are inadequate,
it must decide whether or not it can order Brown to specifically
perform the contract. Because of practical difficulties inherent in
79 Id. at 224.
80 Ramstad, supra note 44, at B4C.
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attempting to force compliance with the contract and the personal
nature of the services required, the court is unlikely to order Brown
to perform.
A. PRACTICAL FACTORS
1. A Court has no Practical Method to Ensure that Brown
Cooperates with DSC. The court has no tool to ensure that Brown
cooperates with the company as required by the agreement.
Montgomery County Canning Co. v. Bates8 sheds light on the
limits of a court's coercive powers.
There, in February of 1946, seventy-one stockholders transferred
their interests in a cannery to the defendant.82 The stockholders
received no money or property in the exchange. Instead, they
completed the transaction to ensure a local market for area produce
growers.' As part of the consideration, the defendant buyer
agreed to operate the cannery in the existing location for the
benefit of local farmers." In October of 1946, however, the
defendant began dismantling the cannery to move it to another
county in violation of the agreement.85
Despite its determination that the stockholders' remedy at law
was inadequate," the court declined to order specific perfor-
mance.87 Recognizing the futility of directing compliance, the
court reasoned that it should not order specific performance when
"the contract is of such a nature that obedience of the decree can
not [sic] be compelled by the ordinary processes of the court.""
The court instead offered to enjoin the defendant's breach of the
agreement.89
The Montgomery County plaintiffs offered a far more sympathetic
justification for specific performance than the commercial and
81 203 S.W.2d 195 (Ark. 1947).
8Id. at 196.
83id.
"Id.
"Id.
"id. at 198.
87Id.
" Id. at 197 (quoting Leonard v. Board of Dirs. of Plum Bayou Levee Dist., 94 S.W. 922
(Ark. 1906).
"I ld. at 198-99.
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labor-oriented motives driving DSC, yet the court refused to order
specific performance. The Montgomery County stockholders,
motivated by a desire to provide a valuable resource for farmers in
the community, made their intent clear in bargaining with the
defendant. Their willingness to transfer their interests absent
monetary or property consideration further accentuated their
community-mindedness. After only eight months, the defendant,
for unspecified reasons, conveniently "forgot" how he came by the
cannery and proceeded to dismantle it in blatant disregard of his
obligations. Montgomery County presents the prototype case for the
proposition that fundamental fairness demands specific perfor-
mance. The court, however, refused the plaintiffs' request because
it recognized its practical limitations.
The DSC/Brown controversy is much less compelling. When DSC
entered the agreement, its sole motivation was its bottom line. The
company presented the agreement to Brown as either an after-
thought or a strategic move six days after he started work. As
interpreted by DSC, the agreement disregards the possibility that
an employee with an innovative idea might, in all fairness, be
entitled to share in the benefits. Unlike the stockholders in
Montgomery County who accepted no money or property consider-
ation, DSC offered Brown no monetary or property consideration.
Instead, the company presented Brown with an agreement, gave
him no opportunity to bargain about its terms, and capitalized on
his weaker position.9
The most important feature shared by Montgomery County and
the present conflict involves practical considerations. Inherent in
both cases is the practical impossibility of forcing compliance with
a decree of specific performance. In precisely the same way that
the court in Montgomery County could not force the defendant to
provide a local market to handle area farmers' produce, no court
can force Brown to speak his mind. The reality is that if Brown
refuses to talk and is willing to sit in jail long enough, the court
cannot make him act against his will.
" Several courts have deemed continued employment sufficient consideration to support
an agreement to assign. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller, 22 F.2d 353 (9th Cir.
1927) (holding that no reason exists for concluding that continued employment as
consideration for an agreement to assign is unconscionable or unfair).
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2. A Court Could Find Supervising an Ongoing Relationship
between the Parties Unduly Burdensome. Because specific
performance would require Brown and DSC to maintain an ongoing
relationship, the potential burden of supervising interaction
between the parties might justify rejecting the remedy. Ambassa-
dor Foods Corp. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.91 clarifies the reason-
ing underlying rejections of specific performance orders when
supervision may prove costly or burdensome.
There the plaintiff owned a concession stand licensed to operate
within defendant's store.92 When the defendant terminated the
agreement, the plaintiff requested specific performance."3 In
rejecting the plaintiffs request, the court noted that decrees
necessitating persistent supervision or multiple proceedings were
unacceptable drains on judicial resources.' Contracts calling for
"varied and continuous acts" increased the likelihood of future
disputes between the parties.95 Noting that two years remained
on the licensing agreement, that the contract allocated control over
advertising and personnel to the defendant store, and that the
agreement required operation of the concession stand in an
"orderly, businesslike manner," the court observed that potential for
multifarious proceedings abounded." The court further recog-
nized that provisions requiring "competitive prices," relinquishing
plaintiffs daily receipts to defendants, and weekly accountings by
defendants held equal potential for discord resulting in consump-
tion of the court's time.97 The court declined to order specific
performance.9 8
The DSC/Brown controversy and Ambassador Foods share
features that suggest that the court should deny specific perfor-
mance. Like the contract in Ambassador Foods, Brown's contract
with DSC calls for continuous, varied services. According to the
terms of the agreement, Brown must not only disclose his idea, but
9' 192 N.E.2d 572 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963).
92 Id. at 574.
3Id. at 575.
94 Id. at 576.
"Id.
9Id.
97 Id.
" Id.
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he must also assist the company in navigating the patent process
at the company's request.99
Brown asserts that written disclosure alone could take a month.
Explaining such a complex idea will necessarily involve judgment,
skill, and diligence. Given the probable animosity between the
parties, communication is likely to be fraught with discord and
disagreement. Passive aggressive behavior by Brown could easily
halt the disclosure process.
The disclosure process alone holds incredible potential for
repeated requests for court intervention. As in Ambassador Foods,
Brown's performance is sufficiently intricate to hold great potential
for disputes requiring the court to interpret the contract's terms
and evaluate Brown's compliance.
In addition disclosure will not end Brown's performance. The
agreement also requires Brown to help DSC obtain a patent. If the
Ambassador court found specific enforcement of a licensing
agreement unpalatable in Ambassador, surely the possibility of
having to supervise the parties through the patenting process is
more undesirable1c°
3. A Court May Have Trouble Assessing Brown's Compliance
with an Order of Specific Performance. A court could also conclude
that the lack of an objectively quantifiable standard for evaluating
Brown's compliance with the contract's terms precludes an order of
specific performance. The California Court of Appeals explained
the rationale behind this rule in Motown Record Corp. v. Brock-
ert,101 a case involving a state statute governing the remedies
available for breach of personal service contracts.
In Motown Records the defendant artist sought relief from a trial
court injunction forbidding her from rendering services to a third
party for the duration of her contract with the plaintiff record
" Defendant Brown's Motion for Summary Judgement and Brief in Support at Exhibit
1, DSC Communications Corp. v. Brown (No. 199-596-97).
100 One authority describes the patent application process as involving unusually heavy
burdens of "diligence and candor" and fraught with opportunities to eliminate the applicant's
rights. ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT § 7.1, at 99-100 (2d ed. 1990). The interplay between DSC's
need for accurate, complete disclosure during the application process and the already adverse
relationship between DSC and Brown suggests a potential for extensive conflict calling for
judicial resolution.
101 207 Cal. Rptr. 574 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
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company. 10 2  In examining the governing statute, the court
recognized a long standing common law rule disfavoring specific
enforcement of personal service contracts. 1 3 The court empha-
sized the difficulty inherent in passing judgement upon the
performance given by the breaching party.'04 Observing that "an
artist does not work well under compulsion,"0 5 the court specu-
lated that stress caused by coerced performance could easily result
in a performance deemed substandard by the compelling party.106
This strain and the resulting possibility of a second-rate perfor-
mance carried great potential for further litigation.0 7 Further-
more, the court decided that assessing the quality of a coerced
party's artistic performance exceeded the judiciary's competence
because of a lack of objective criteria. 0 8
The Brown/DSC conflict parallels Motown Records and compels
the conclusion that specific performance is not a suitable remedy.
The Motown Records court emphasized the inherent subjectivity in
evaluating an artistic performance and noted a desire not to
generate further litigation.0 9 Although Brown's performance
requires exercise of intellectual and communicative capacities
rather than artistic talents, evaluating his compliance necessarily
requires making the same species of subjective judgement feared by
the Motown Records court.
Assume, for example, that a court ordered Brown's compliance
with the agreement. In addition, suppose that during disclosure
DSC officials believed that Brown communicated his idea in an
intentionally cryptic, convoluted manner. Presume also that DSC
officials suspected Brown of withholding information despite his
claims of complete disclosure.
Parallel to the court's concerns in Motown Records, the likelihood
of subsequent disputes between the parties is high. If DSC asked
the court to resolve the disagreements, how could the court judge
'2 Id. at 577.
'03 I& at 578.
104 Id. at 583.
"'Id. at 584.
106Id.
107Id.
108Id.
09 Id. at 583.
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Brown's good faith? Like the situation described in Motown
Records, the court has no standard against which to measure
Brown's ability to communicate his thoughts. The court has no
means of examining the contents of Brown's brain to see if any
undisclosed portions of the innovation remain. Not only would the
parties be more likely to call on the court to adjudicate future
disputes because of the forced continuation of a relationship gone
sour, but the court's tools for discerning Brown's conscientiousness
are blunt at best.
B. IS DSC ASKING FOR ENFORCEMENT OF A PERSONAL SERVICE
CONTRACT?11
The court may not enforce Brown's agreement because the
contract calls for personal services. Courts generally refuse to
enforce personal service contracts."' Although limited authority
supports an order of specific performance in the employment
context," 2 the court is unlikely to adopt similar reasoning in
deciding the DSC/Brown dispute.
1. Has Brown Agreed to Render Personal Services? Brown's
agreement with DSC is probably a personal service contract.
Several policy factors explain the common law bar against specific
performance of this type of agreement. First, courts fear the
necessity of repeated evaluation of the quality of a coerced party's
performance." 3 Second, courts prefer not to mandate compliance
with contracts calling for a continuing personal association
following heated disputes." 4 Third, courts express an unwilling-
11 According to Comment b of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 367, "[a] performance
is not a personal service ... unless it is ... non-delegable. However, not every non-delegable
performance is properly described as a service .... In determining what is a personal
service, the policies reflected in the more general rules on the effect of public policy (§ 365)
and of the difficulty of enforcement (§ 366) are relevant. The importance of trust and
confidence in the relation between the parties, the difficulty of judging the quality of the
performance rendered and the length of time required for performance are significant
factors." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 cmt. b (1991).
. Id. at § 367(1).
12 See American Ass'n. of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 322 A.2d 846 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (permitting specific enforcement of a personal service contract upon
the request of the person to perform the services).
FARNSWORTH, supra note 54, § 12.7, at 868.
114 Id.
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ness to issue orders that the performing party can render worthless
by simply refusing to comply."' Finally, sometimes courts are
reluctant to compel performance of personal services because of the
flavor of involuntary servitude accompanying such an order. 116
Identifying the type of personal service contract that a court will
refuse to enforce offers a challenge. As one scholar noted, "A
service is not personal... unless it is nondelegable, but not every
nondelegable performance is personal. For example, even though
the signing of one's name is nondelegable, it may be compelled by
specific performance."" 7  Wilson v. Sandstrom,"' a 1975 case
decided by the Supreme Court of Florida, and Thompson v.
Virginia,"9 decided in 1955 by the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia, explain the distinction between personal service contracts
and other types of agreements.
The Supreme Court of Florida distinguished non-specifically
enforceable personal service contracts from specifically enforceable
contracts in Wilson.2' That case involved a contract dispute
between the owners of a greyhound racing track and several kennel
owners who contracted to supply the track with trained dogs. 2 '
Finding the contract specifically enforceable because it was not a
personal service contract,'22 the court emphasized the nature of
the performance required and the status of the defendants.
The court began by noting that the contract required the kennel
owners to supply dogs to the track.'23 Although the owners had
to ensure that the dogs were trained, according to the court, these
obligations did not arise pursuant to the terms of the agree-
ment.'24 Instead, the court said, the requirements originated
with the rules governing greyhound racing. 2 ' Consequently, the
court concluded, in meeting the obligation to train the dogs, the
"5 71 AM. JUR. 2D Specific Performance § 164 (1973).
:i FARNSWORTH, supra note 54, § 12.8, at 868.
17 Id. at 868 n.19.
11 317 So.2d 732 (Fla. 1975).
" 89 S.E.2d 64 (Va. 1955).
" Wilson, 317 So.2d at 732.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 738.
123 Id. at 739.
124Id.
'
2
3 Id. at 738.
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owners fulfilled obligations to the state and not to the track
owner.
126
Emphasizing the nature of the contract as one involving provid-
ing a commodity rather than a service, the court found the owners'
contractual obligations limited to tendering the dogs one hour
before racing time. 127  The court held that the kennel owners'
duty ceased upon delivery of the dogs, that the contract did not call
for personal services, and that specific performance was the
appropriate remedy.
121
Similarly, in Thompson v. Virginia,29 the court required two
defendants to comply with the provisions of a settlement agree-
ment. Crafted to resolve a dispute between the defendants and the
state regarding ownership of various tools and patents, the contract
required the defendants to construct and deliver patented compo-
nents of an automated voting system used in the state legislature.
The court declined to label the agreement a personal service
contract. Noting that the state could not obtain the parts on the
open market, the court relied on the defendant's admissions that
any "first class machine shop" could manufacture the parts.
3 0
The court reasoned that either the defendants or the state could
seek a third party to manufacture the components.' The court
concluded that fairness required the defendants to bear the
responsibility and risks associated with finding an alternative
manufacturer. Relying on the defendants' evidence, the court
concluded that mandating specific performance would not require
them to render personal services "involving skill, labor and
judgement."32
Unlike the contracts in Wilson or Thompson, the DSC/Brown
agreement explicitly calls for personal services and thereby falls
within the black letter bar that forbids an order of specific perfor-
mance. Any attempt to characterize Brown's idea as a commodity,
as the Wilson court did, must fail simply by virtue of its intangible
128 id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 737-738, 741.
'2 89 S.E.2d 64 (Va. 1955).
130 Id. at 68.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 69.
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nature.13 3 Similarly, successfully characterizing disclosure as a
ministerial act, another tactic used in Wilson, holds little promise
because long term personal interaction exceeding the extent of the
acts required by the Wilson defendants must take place for effective
transfer of Brown's thoughts.
Furthermore, unlike the Thompson defendants, Brown cannot
contract with a third party to perform his obligation. Brown has
exclusive access to the needed information, and no third party can
perform his disclosure obligations. The contract calls for personal
services.
2. Can the Court Order Brown's Compliance with the Contract
Anyway? Although a narrow exception exists to the black letter
rule forbidding orders of specific performance of personal service
contracts in the employment context, this case does not fit the
exception. The exception is well described in American Association
of University Professors v. Bloomfield College.'34
In that case the defendant college, claiming extraordinary
financial difficulties, dismissed thirteen tenured faculty members
in violation of the members' employment contracts. 135 The college
also placed the remainder of its faculty members on one year
terminal contracts.'36 During the same period, the institution
hired twelve additional non-tenured faculty members in an attempt
to implement a modified curriculum. 137
In deciding to reinstate the dismissed faculty members, effective-
ly a specific performance order, the court examined the institution's
hostility toward its contractual obligations to tenured employees.
The court first observed that placing the remaining faculty
members, both tenured and non-tenured, on single year terminable
contracts offered no immediate financial benefits to the college.
1 38
Calling the action "a calculated repudiation of a contractual duty
without any semblance of legal justification," the court deemed the
" Black's Law Dictionary defines a commodity as W[t]hose things which are useful or
serviceable, particularly articles of merchandise movable in trade... [g]oods, wares, and
merchandise of any kind; movables." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 342 (4th ed. 1951).
'34 322 A.2d 846 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974).
1 Id. at 848.
38 id. at 856.
137 Id. at 849.
L"Id. at 856.
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action "a gratuitous challenge to the principle of academic tenure
... lack[ing] ... sensitivity to the question of moral correct-
ness." 3 ' The court observed that the college's complete lack of
concern about its contractual duties cast doubt on the necessity and
validity of its discharge of the thirteen tenured faculty mem-
bers. 4 ° Noting the vaguely drawn parameters of the revised
curriculum offered as a justification for the hires, the court also
questioned the college's failure to explain why the dismissed
members could not effectively implement its terms."' In addi-
tion, the court noted that the college instituted the new program
after the dismissed faculty members filed suit.
42
Further, the court examined the institution's long-term financial
difficulties. According to a university official, financing at the
college was always difficult.43  Relying on this testimony, the
court expressed doubt that the circumstances leading to dismissal
of the tenured members were any more urgent than normal. 44
The court concluded that the circumstances offered to justify
repudiation could not be pronounced grave unless it deemed the
college's financial status chronically exigent.
4
The court ordered specific performance of the employment
agreement by directing reinstatement of the thirteen severed
faculty members. 46 The court relied on cases generally support-
ing the flexibility of equitable jurisdiction and on Professor
Williston's observation that "appealing factual situations may
occasionally induce a court to enforce a personal service contract
specifically, particularly in the absence of any personal relationship
between the parties." 47
The contract at issue in Bloomfield called for personal services of
the dismissed professors, the parties seeking to enforce the
agreement. 48  The agreement required only ministerial acts by
139Id.
140Id.
141 Id.
142 id.
43 Id. at 857.
144Id.
145 id.
146 Id. at 860.
"
7 Id. (quoting SAMUEL WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1424, at 786-87).
'"American Assoc. of Univ. Professors, 322 A.2d at 847-48.
1998] 657
27
Turner: Preinvention Assignment Agreement Breach: A Practical Alternative
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1998
J. INTELL PROP. L.
college officials.149 Here, DSC, the party with only ministerial
duties, seeks enforcement. Where the specific performance order
in Bloomfield implicated no involuntary servitude concerns, such an
order in the DSC/Brown controversy involves DSC using the court
as a tool for conscripting Brown's labors. Specific performance in
employment contracts appears available only to employees seeking
to enforce agreements and not to employers. Consequently, the
court is unlikely to adopt a Bloomfield rationale and order Brown
to specifically perform.
C. THE COURT IS UNLIKELY TO ORDER SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
The court is unlikely to specifically enforce the contract against
Brown. Practical obstacles including the difficulty of achieving
compliance, hardship on the court, and problems with evaluating
Brown's compliance prevent an order for specific performance.
Likewise, the contract is a personal service contract subject to a
black letter ban on enforcement. Furthermore, the limited
authority supporting specific performance of agreements in the
employment context does not support a specific performance order
in the Brown/DSC context because of the flavor of involuntary
servitude.
IV. CAN THE COURT ENJOIN BROWN FROM PERFORMING
His OBLIGATIONS FOR A THIRD PARTY?
The court could enjoin Brown from performing his obligations for
a third party by finding that Brown impliedly contracted to
perform only for DSC. Because injunctive relief for DSC would not
negate Brown's ability to support himself, the court could find an
injunction appropriate. The indefinite duration of the parties'
contract, however, reduces the likelihood of an unconditional
injunction that prevents Brown's performance for a third party.
149 Id.
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A. WOULD AN INJUNCTION UNDULY INTERFERE WITH BROWN'S
ABILITY TO WORK?
The court is unlikely to find that injunctive relief for DSC would
unreasonably interfere with Brown's ability to work; however, the
potential for such an order to coerce actual performance is question-
able. In ABC v. Wolf, 50 the Court of Appeals of New York de-
tailed the circumstances under which the court would consider
issuing an injunction against an employee performing for a third
party..
In a dispute arising after a sportscaster breached a contractual
obligation to negotiate in good faith, the court denied an injunction
barring him from working for a competitor. 51 At the time of the
suit, the employment contract had expired. Although the court
ultimately denied equitable relief, it discussed circumstances under
which it would be willing to find a negative covenant not to perform
for a third party.
The court first noted that despite the general rule barring specific
enforcement of personal service contracts, "negative specific
performance "1 52 might be appropriate when special or extraordi-
nary services were at issue.153 If, the court said, an employer
would be "irreparably" injured by the employee serving a competi-
tor, then such an alternative could be considered. 54 When, either
expressly or by implication, an employee agreed not to render
services for a certain period, injunctive relief was permissible to
prevent the employee from working for a third party.'55
The court reasoned that an employee who contracted to provide
but refused to perform unique services could properly be enjoined
from rendering those services to a third party, but that this
injunction was limited to the term of the agreement.156 The court
noted that the broadcaster did not claim any special tortious injury
from the sportscaster's breach. Unwilling to "unduly interfere with
150 420 N.E.2d 363 (N.Y. 1981).
' Id. at 364.
,52 Id. at 367.
13 Id.
154Id.
155 Id.
'56 Id. at 368.
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an individual's livelihood and to inhibit free competition [absent]
S.. corresponding injury to the employer other than the loss of a
competitive edge," the court declined to order injunctive relief.157
Relying on the reasoning in ABC, the DSC court might be willing
to order "negative specific performance" and enjoin disclosure of
Brown's idea to third parties. Unlike the injunction requested in
ABC, enjoining disclosure in Brown's case would not impair
Brown's ability to work. Forbidding third party disclosure perma-
nently restricts Brown's ability to render only one particular
performance, whereas enjoining the sportscaster would have
involved an indefinite moratorium on the defendant's ability to
work in his trade. Because an injunction would prevent Brown
only from discussing this single idea, an injunction would not harm
Brown's ability to support himself in his trade. An injunction
against Brown would not, therefore, have the overreaching effects
of the injunction requested by the broadcasting company.
The efficacy of implying a duty on Brown's behalf to disclose his
idea only to DSC is questionable. Preventing Brown from disclos-
ing his idea to a third party will not necessarily force Brown to
disclose his idea to DSC. Such an injunction could result in
valuable information being withheld from consumers. In the
present context, the remedy lacks the coercive force that makes
injunctive relief desirable.
One can easily conceive that Brown might, in perfect compliance
with an injunction, choose to carry his innovation to his grave
rather than disclose the information to DSC. Should Brown choose
compliance by silence, the benefits of a potentially valuable
innovation could be lost.
Because an injunction would not impair Brown's ability to
support himself, the court might consider using this form of relief.
Unfortunately, the feature that makes an injunction most attrac-
tive-its coercive force-is absent precisely because Brown can still
earn a living without performing his agreement. The possibility
that the remedy would not get the information to businesses who
need it calls the wisdom of employing the remedy into question.
157 Id.
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B. WOULD THE INDEFINITE TERM OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT POSE
A PROBLEM?
The indefinite term of Brown's contract could pose a barrier to
injunctive relief; however, the reasons for the barrier relate to
public policy rather than the potential effects on Brown. Although
Brown's obligations under the contract extend indefinitely so that
an injunction would have no expiration date, this fact alone
probably does not bar using this form of relief. Lemat Corp. v.
Barry"' explains judicial concerns about the duration of an
obligation.
In Lemat, a professional basketball player breached his agree-
ment with the San Francisco Warriors by entering into a contract
to play for the Oaks.159 Although the contract gave the Warriors
the right to renew the player's contract for only two years, 16° the
team claimed entitlement to a seven year injunction under a
California statute."' The court of appeals rejected the team's
argument, concluding that the California statute did not enlarge
the team's right to injunctive relief beyond the term of the con-
tract.
162
Assuming that the player's talents were sufficiently unique to
pass the threshold inquiry," the appellate court noted that
grants of injunctive relief in cases involving performers and
athletes were based on the notion that the employers contracted for
"the exclusive right to display" the extraordinary talents of the
" 'star' for a given period."'" Policies favoring strict construction
of agreements restricting a person's ability to work in his or her
trade, the court reasoned, weighed against extending the term of
the injunction beyond the finite period called for in the con-
tract. 6 The court implicitly concluded that while a two year
restraint on the player's ability to work was not unreasonable, a
seven year restraint extended beyond permissible limits. 66
... 275 Cal. App. 2d 671 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
1 9 d. at 673-674.
'60 Id. at 675-676.
"' Id. at 676.
x'2 id. at 679.
'
83 Id. at 678.
164 Id. at 678.
1 Id. at 679.
16 Id.
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Under the reasoning in Lemat, Brown's defenses against an
injunction are weak. Like the player in Lemat, Brown's perfor-
mance meets the threshold uniqueness requirement. In Brown's
case, however, enforcing an indefinite obligation to refrain from
disclosure to a third party does not nullify his earning capacity. All
of the arguments stemming from the effects of an injunction on
Brown fail to rise to the level of unreasonableness.
The present conflict implicates other concerns besides the ones
articulated in Lemat. The practical effect of an injunction could
easily be an indefinite impediment that prevents the exchange of
potentially valuable information until the value of the idea
dissipates entirely. Because Brown, unlike the Lemat defendant,
can make a handsome living outside of his role as an engineer of
binary code translation algorithms,' his motivation to disclose
the idea to DSC is diminished.
Public policy disfavors waste. If the court enjoined Brown
unconditionally from disclosing his idea to third parties, the
injunction would effectively enable Brown to dissipate the value of
the idea and deprive businesses of an efficient tool without causing
any substantial hardship on Brown. This result, from an economic
efficiency standpoint, is undesirable.
C. A COURT IS NOT LIKELY TO ORDER UNCONDITIONAL INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF
Unconditional injunctive relief, while certainly supportable under
the law, impairs the public interest to a sufficient degree to justify
rejecting the remedy. Although this solution does not interfere
with the parties' interests, the remedy hurts the public because of
its potential to waste a valuable resource. Consequently, the court
should reject this alternative.
V. SPLITING THE BABY
Although no perfect remedy exists, the court must fashion a fair
and workable solution that accounts for most of the competing
... While working for DSC, the company paid Brown $96,000 per year to maintain a
computer system used by engineers designing switches for cellular telephones. Ramstad,
supra note 44, at B4C.
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concerns within the controversy. First, the court should grant the
parties a final divorce that will sever the relationship and minimize
the potential for future disputes. Second, Brown's compliance with
the order must be obtainable and objectively verifiable. Third, the
remedy must remove restrictions on commerce and free the idea for
development so that society can enjoy the benefits of a money-
saving process while that process retains its value. Fourth, the
resolution must foster incentive to create without destroying future
contractors' expectations of receiving the benefits of freely made
bargains. Fifth, the court should not permit DSC as an employer
to reap the full benefits of an overly broad agreement that takes
unfair advantage of Brown's weaker position as an employee.
Finally, the court must fairly allocate the risks of the idea's failure.
All of these objectives may be accomplished by granting the
equivalent of a common law "shop right" to DSC, requiring Brown
to purchase the idea from the company and enjoining his disclosure
to third parties until after the price is paid.
At common law, a shop right arises in the following manner:
when an employer hires an employee for some purpose besides
inventing, scholars term the relationship "general,"168 as opposed
-to a "specific" relationship that arises when a company hires
someone for the particular purpose of inventing.169 When a
general employee invents and patents a new product or process
that the employer can use in its business, at common law courts
presume some contribution of resources by the employer during the
process and grant the employer an equitable, nonexclusive right to
use the invention. 70 Preinvention assignment agreements like
the one used by DSC exist as an attempt to contract around this
common law rule and secure outright ownership for an employer
rather than simple use rights.
Because DSC hired Brown to provide technical support for its
engineers' computer system and not to reverse engineer a binary
translation mechanism, Brown is appropriately classified as a
general employee. Although DSC does not claim to be in the
business of binary code conversion, the company claims a use for
MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EmPLOYMENT LAW § 8.20, at 520 (1994).
''ld.1 0Id. at 521.
19981 663
33
Turner: Preinvention Assignment Agreement Breach: A Practical Alternative
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1998
J. INTELL PROP. L.
Brown's inventions. Granting DSC a shop right gives the company
the benefit of considerable in-house savings while still enabling
Brown to reap some financial benefits from his creation. Under
this scenario, after Brown develops his idea, interaction between
the parties would be minimal and probably involve little more than
a one-time transfer of information. Such an order would not
necessitate extensive court supervision. Brown's compliance would
be objectively verifiable. If Brown could convey the idea successful-
ly to the patent office and consumers, then he should certainly be
able to communicate adequately with DSC for the -same limited
purpose.
Because granting a shop right to DSC may provide an insuffi-
cient monetary remedy, the court could also require Brown to make
a payment before permitting him to develop his innovation.
Because Brown freely entered theagreement and then breached at
a time when his only complaint related to the adequacy of the
exchange, requiring him to purchase his idea from DSC seems fair.
Furthermore, requiring Brown to buy the idea appropriately places
the- risks of failure on him while still honoring the existence of his
contractual duty.
Moreover, by enjoining disclosure until Brown pays, the court
ensures that DSC receives a substantial sum regardless of the
idea's success. If the idea succeeds, then Brown reaps most of the
benefits of his creativity. If the idea fails, then Brown loses his
gamble.
A money payment plus shop right solution accomplishes the
court's objectives. Except for the very limited interaction necessary
to transfer know-how once Brown reduces the idea to practice, the
solution effectively severs the relationship upon payment of
damages. The likelihood of future disputes between the parties is
no greater than in any other dispute involving a money settlement.
This solution removes legal obstacles that currently impede the
idea's development and offers appropriate protection for Brown as
an inventor by allowing him to reap financial benefits of his
creativity. Similarly, the remedy honors DSC's reasonable expecta-
tions by giving the company the limited benefits of its bargain.
Furthermore, the resolution compensates DSC while removing the
risks of failure.
664 [Vol. 5:631
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VI. CONCLUSION
The most appropriate remedy involves granting DSC the right to
use Brown's invention in the course of its business and requiring
Brown to purchase the idea from DSC before disclosure to third
parties. Presuming a valid, enforceable contract free from forma-
tional defects, neither specific performance nor unqualified
injunction are appropriate.
Practical and policy problems counsel against injunction or
specific performance. Because of the unique nature of the perfor-
mance Brown promised to render, the company's inability to obtain
a substitute performance, and the lack of information upon which
to compute damages with reasonable certainty, the court could
reasonably conclude that damages at law are inadequate. The
court is unlikely to order specific performance, however, because of
the practical difficulties with enforcement including the difficulty
of coercing performance by Brown, the hardship that supervising
performance could produce for the court, and the difficulty of
evaluating compliance with an order of specific performance.
Additionally, because the contract is a personal service contract and
insufficient authority exists for enforcing such an agreement, the
likelihood that the court will refuse specific performance increases.
The company can probably obtain an injunction forbidding Brown
from performing for a third party because such an order, although
of indefinite duration, is unlikely to interfere with Brown's ability
to work in the future. This remedy, however, could result in
halting development of the idea until time dissipates its value
entirely.
Ultimately, the court must return to the common law and to
money for a solution. Right to use for DSC and a compelled
purchase price offer the most appropriate means for balancing
private, public, and judicial interests. The equivalent of a common
law shop right and a forced sale offer a viable solution.
JENNY R. TURNER
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